New ways of conceptualizing the Cold War not only as a confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States, but also as an articulation between social struggles and sociopolitical conflicts of different scales, scopes, and logics, allow us to formulate new questions to investigate the presence of Salvadoran militants exiled in Mexico from the late 1970s until the 1992 Peace Accords: In what spaces did Salvadoran militants converge with Mexican activists? And how did these interactions influence the strategies, connections, and imaginaries of Mexican social and political activism? What impact did the reception of the Central American revolutionary processes —especially in El Salvador— have on the worldviews, practices, and organizational methods of Mexican social activism?
Finally, how did Mexican state intelligence agencies react to the presence of Salvadoran refugees and the organization of a broad solidarity movement that involved popular organizations and movements opposed to the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI)?
Here we present the convergences between exiled militants and Mexican activists from three perspectives: 1) the political practices and survival strategies of exiled militants from the various political-military organizations that formed the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN); 2) the vision of Mexican leftist activism in solidarity with the Central American revolutionary movements; and 3) the vision of national security held by the security apparatus, which guided the state’s interpretations and views regarding the presence of Salvadoran political refugees and Mexican solidarity activities toward them.
The presence of Salvadoran revolutionaries in Mexico was related to the foreign policy objectives of Mexican governments —especially those of José López Portillo and Miguel de la Madrid— to promote a political and negotiated solution to the Central American crisis in general, and the Salvadoran conflict in particular. Mexican foreign policy was based both on the objective of moving away from its traditional bilateral orientation toward the United States and on considering the situation in Central America a national security problem for the country.
It was therefore up to the national diplomacy to promote dialogue between political adversaries, in order to reduce tensions that could spill over into Mexican territory, specifically Chiapas. This conciliatory stance did not exclude the government’s decision to support the Nicaraguan revolution and recognize the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) as a representative political force through the 1981 Franco-Mexican Declaration, offset in part by not granting the same treatment to Guatemalan revolutionary organizations. Although the 1982 debt crisis led the De la Madrid administration to moderate Mexico’s stance on support for the Central American revolutionary processes, efforts to promote a Regional Plan for Détente continued. Mexico’s participation in the Contadora Group attests to this.
Although there was no consistent policy of persecution and deportation of undocumented Salvadorans, the Interior Ministry closely monitored the political activities of Salvadoran exiles and their interaction with Mexican activists, as intelligence reports demonstrate. On the other hand, exiled militants recognized the contradictory position of the Mexican government in accepting, on the one hand, Latin American revolutionaries persecuted by their governments, while at the same time repressing the radical Mexican left. They were also aware of the restrictions on political activity imposed by the Mexican authorities, which prohibited them from participating in or expressing opinions on domestic political issues. All these factors conditioned the political and social participation of the refugees, which consequently focused on supporting the political and military struggle of the FMLN in El Salvador.
From the perspective of exiled Salvadoran activists, Mexico City fulfilled three functions: it was a bridge, a rear guard, and a voice for political-military organizations. It was a “bridge” because, for many militants and combatants, Mexico became a point of arrival for those who had to leave their country for political reasons, and a transit point for those who wanted to continue on to the United States and Canada or return to El Salvador. To achieve this purpose, social support networks were set up —often under the protection of parishes and congregations— which proved important in getting people out of danger and offering them refuge in the city. However, Mexico and its capital also served as a conduit in the opposite direction, for “messengers” from third countries (mainly Cuba) to pass on information, resources, and, according to one interview, weapons for the Salvadoran revolution.
As the war progressed and Salvadoran activists remained, the “bridge” became a “rear guard.” In effect, thanks to these foreign policy positions, the FMLN considered Mexico an ideal platform for the international work of its political-diplomatic apparatus. This work was structured in the same way as in El Salvador: Coordination between the five political-military organizations of the FMLN was carried out at the leadership level. But in establishing contacts and solidarity networks with Mexican organizations, each organization maintained and cared for its own contacts and work fronts.
To sustain a small organizational apparatus dedicated to this solidarity work, the political-military organizations assigned some “cadres” to communicate and disseminate information related to the situation in El Salvador (focusing especially on issues of government repression and the military successes of the guerrillas) and to maintain links with Mexican organizations, in exchange for providing them with some protection, stability, and a minimum income. For example, through departments and houses —often made available by Mexicans in solidarity with the Salvadoran struggle— they provided money to cover essential expenses and, in some cases, travel to other countries such as the United States, Canada, or Australia.
This meant that some political-military cadres who had retained formal jobs in El Salvador tended to become “professionals” in the organization in Mexico, working in committees and platforms through which solidarity support for the FMLN was mobilized. This is the case of one of the interviewees, who initially planned to stay in Mexico for only three months, until the death squads stopped following her in her country. But when she joined the solidarity work promoted by national and Salvadoran organizations in Mexico City, her stay inevitably extended.
As a center for debate, analysis, and denunciation, Mexico City also made it possible to recruit Mexican citizens, without whom it would not have been possible to sustain the FMLN’s organizational network in exile. There were various forms of support: hosting newly arrived Salvadorans, paying the rent for the premises of one of the solidarity organizations, or offering their facilities —from offices to dining rooms— so that exiles could meet, write their bulletins, or plan their activities. But national activists not only joined the civil solidarity movement with El Salvador; they also joined the war fronts as doctors, nurses, teachers, and combatants.
In the Eyes of Maximiliano, Everyone Was an Enemy
In this sense, Mexico functioned as a place to build and consolidate solidarity networks and spread the messages of the insurgency to the world. According to one interviewee, for the Salvadoran revolutionary movement, Mexico was the “voice to the world.” Consequently, an important part of the organizational structure of the FMLN organizations in Mexico, and therefore of the activities of exiled militants, revolved around the tasks of denunciation and solidarity. In this task, some militants were able to take advantage of the links they had forged with journalists from the national media, such as the newspapers El Día and Unomásuno, to disseminate positions or bulletins or use their facilities to access the international news necessary for the analysis of the situation carried out by political-military organizations (as was the case with Unomásuno).
Political activism on issues such as human rights and political prisoners found fertile ground in parishes and Base Ecclesial Communities (CEB). Starting in 1981, at the request of the Salvadoran episcopate, their Mexican counterparts began to organize several “Crusades to Aid the People of El Salvador” in parishes in Mexico City. Through masses and fasts, the aim was to denounce the political persecution of religious and lay people in El Salvador. This environment fostered the formation of committees more closely linked to the popular church. Such was the case of the Monsignor Óscar Arnulfo Romero Committee, which promoted a discourse and practice inspired by liberation Christianity and liberation theology, and was open to the participation of militants from FMLN organizations.
Central America Seen from Mexico
The arrival of Salvadorans in Mexico coincided with a period of significant political and social mobilization. After the state repression of the 1968 student movement and the dirty war against guerrilla groups, the political reform of 1977 opened up spaces for legal political participation for the reformist left, such as the Mexican Communist Party (PCM), later renamed the Unified Socialist Party of Mexico (PSUM), and the Socialist Workers’ Party (PST). In the areas of social mobilization, the second half of the 1970s was characterized by the emergence of trade-union, campesino, and urban-popular organizations that confronted the corporate and clientelist practices of the PRI’s social organizations, promoting processes of coordination, unification, and politicization based on the struggle for particular and local demands.
Special mention should be made of the formation of the National Coordination of the Popular Urban Movement (CONAMUP), which brought together the experiences of numerous urban organizations that had emerged in previous years in the struggle for housing and public services. During this period, and until the mid-1980s, the popular urban movement was undoubtedly the most dynamic social movement and a space where the socialist left was able to insert itself most easily. Another important actor in this period, and present in the urban-popular space, was the CEB. The popular organizations that emerged in this context of social mobilization shared, despite the particularities of their demands, the struggles for political democratization and against corporatism and PRI clientelism.
Above all, in the political-cultural spheres of the socialist left and liberation Christianity, there was a heightened awareness of the social struggles and emancipation processes taking place in other countries in the region. The solidarity campaigns that began in 1975 in support of El Salvador reinforced this awareness.
In this context, the founding of the Mexican Committee of Solidarity with the Salvadoran People (CMSPS) in Mexico City in 1979 played an important role in linking Salvadoran and Mexican activists, coordinating national solidarity campaigns, distributing propaganda, and raising funds for the Revolutionary Democratic Front (FDR), the guerrilla movement’s political-civil front. At its peak, the Committee had approximately 600 active members in Mexico City —where its national headquarters were located— and in regional committees in various cities throughout the republic: Morelia, San Cristóbal de las Casas, Guanajuato, and Toluca, among others.
The CMSPS had been founded by activists and leaders of various left-wing organizations and parties (such as the Revolutionary Workers' Party, the PST, and the PCM) in solidarity with the Salvadoran revolution and in contact with the exiled leadership of the FMLN-FDR. Therefore, the public acts of solidarity it organized —such as rallies, demonstrations, conferences, and solidarity strikes in unions and universities— were also an opportunity for Mexican organizations and movements to present their demands regarding specific conflicts and struggles in the national public sphere.
Notable examples include the presence of Rosario Ibarra as representative of the National Committee for the Defense of Political Prisoners (and presidential candidate in 1982) at solidarity events with El Salvador in 1981 and 1982, as well as trade unions, campesino organizations, and urban-popular organizations that presented slogans and banners to highlight their demands and grievances.
The Interior Ministry’s Gaze
As noted at the outset, while there was no active willingness on the part of the Mexican authorities to recognize Salvadoran refugees as political asylum seekers, there was also no coherent policy of persecution or deportation. This ambiguity allowed the Interior Ministry authorities a wide margin of discretion in their relations with refugees and political activists, which was generally interpreted in favor of the refugees.
The arbitrariness and political control of the Interior Ministry’s agents made Salvadoran militants aware that the permanent surveillance exercised by the state was intended to force them to follow the “rules of the game,” which conditioned foreign activism in Mexico City as in the rest of the country: Political work could be done when it was oriented toward supporting revolutionary struggles in El Salvador or Central America, but they could not support or participate in protests against the PRI government, nor could they use the country as a logistical base for military activities. The FMLN leadership also imposed this principle on its militants so as not to jeopardize the space for action and the diplomatic and official ties that had been built in Mexico.
Surveillance and control practices by national-security agencies meant that exiled militants also tended to maintain their strategies of camouflage and compartmentalization. One interviewee said that, in order to support Mexican popular organizations in solidarity with the Salvadoran struggle, she had to “disguise” herself with sunglasses and large hats to attend marches and rallies. Another interviewee said that the militant habit of constantly changing homes, always checking to see if they were being followed, and never taking the most direct route to political meetings, stuck among Salvadoran activists in Mexico. This was not only to avoid surveillance by state informants, but also to prevent possible tracking by secret agents of the Salvadoran security apparatus who had arrived in the country to watch and monitor FMLN cadres.
The concern was not only about possible Cuban or Soviet intervention, but also about the threat posed by U.S. involvement in Central American conflicts, whose geopolitics could encourage the spread of civil wars affecting Mexican national security, mainly on the southern border. In this regard, a report by the Federal Security Directorate consulted, in Mexico’s General Archive of the Nation, referred to this concern by raising as a hypothetical scenario the interest of the United States in further destabilizing the border between Guatemala and Mexico. The objective would be to provide a valid argument that would allow the Reagan administration to increase counterinsurgency support for the Guatemalan military regime.
In conclusion, the reconstruction of the practices of militant exile requires a (re)orientation of the analytical gaze to focus more on the interactions and networks of militants, not only within the national group, but also between national exiles —relationships of support and solidarity, but also of mistrust and conflict— with Mexican militants and activists. There are still many silences and taboos: Both the Salvadoran and Mexican interviewees insisted in the interviews that there were no systematic contacts or mutual support in political work, beyond solidarity work to denounce state terrorism and spread the popular and revolutionary struggle in El Salvador.
Kristina Pirker is a professor and researcher at the Dr. José María Luis Mora Research Institute; Omar Núñez Rodríguez is a professor and researcher at the College of History/Autonomous University of Mexico City. This article is an excerpt from the chapter on El Salvador in the book México ante el conflicto centroamericano, Testimonio de una época. Coordinators: Mario Vázquez Olivera and Fabián Campos Hernández. (Mexico: Bonilla Artigas Editores: UNAM, Center for Research on Latin America and the Caribbean, 2016).